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Foreword 
During 1998, two academic staff at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research provided 
Ms Siobhan McDonnell with supervisory advice during her research for an Honours thesis in 
economics at The Australian National University. Late in 1998, Ms McDonnell completed her 
thesis ‘Giving Credit Where Its Due: A Study of the Feasibility of Replicating a Grameen Bank 
Type Model in Rural Aboriginal Communities in Australia’.  
This thesis was especially topical as during 1998 the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA) was conducting an 
Inquiry into Indigenous Business and the issues of access to venture capital and micro-credit 
were clearly of policy relevance. While undertaking research for her thesis, Ms McDonnell 
maintained contact with HORSCATSIA staff. 
The Federal election of October 1998 cut short the HORSCATSIA Inquiry and a final report 
on the indigenous business Inquiry was not completed (see CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 177). 
Nevertheless, the issue of the applicability of Grameen Banks to the indigenous Australian 
context remains extremely relevant, as does the wider issue of indigenous access to credit. 
Consequently, in February 1999, I negotiated with Ms McDonnell to spend a period of time at 
CAEPR as a Visiting Research Scholar (with grant) revising her honours thesis into a CAEPR 
discussion paper. Since then she has continued working at CAEPR as a part-time Research 
Assistant to Dr Boyd Hunter, working on indigenous poverty issues. 
As a young graduate economist, Ms McDonnell has taken an important initiative in defining 
a research question and undertaking rigorous desk-based research to address it. I commend her 
efforts and believe her paper makes a significant contribution to an important, and very current, 
indigenous economic policy issue. 
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
April 1999 
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Summary 
Policy-makers have become increasingly interested in the use of micro-credit models to alleviate 
poverty among Australian indigenous communities. These models, such as the model developed 
by the Grameen Bank, work to extend small amounts of credit to entrepreneurs too poor to 
qualify for commercial lending. The key element of the Grameen Bank model is its peer group 
lending structure, which fosters mutual accountability for loans among borrowers. 
Neither the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) nor commercial 
lending institutions have utilised micro-credit lending strategies. While internal analysis 
conducted by ATSIC shows that smaller loans (of less than $30,000) are more likely to be repaid, 
ATSIC loans to indigenous businesses continue to be relatively large. Restriction of lending to 
large loans has, however, effectively excluded large numbers of potential borrowers from access to 
credit. Credit access problems are further compounded for indigenous women, who often have 
limited credit records and no collateral.  
Case studies of replications of micro-credit programs with indigenous communities in 
America and Canada show that it is possible to adapt these programs to developed countries. 
However, policy-makers may encounter a series of problems when trying to adapt a similar model 
to Australia. In particular the presence of low population density, welfare payments, investment 
opportunities and specific indigenous cultural practices are problems that need to be addressed if 
such a model is to be viable.  
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Introduction 
In their recent submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA) Inquiry into Indigenous Business the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) argued for the need ‘to focus on very small or micro-
businesses as having the greatest potential for increasing indigenous economic status and job 
creation’ (ATSIC 1998: iii). If indigenous micro-businesses are ever to generate these gains they 
must be provided with adequate access to credit. One credit model that has been receiving 
increasing amounts of attention in Australia is the Grameen Bank micro-credit model.  
The Grameen Bank defines micro-credit as the extension of small loans to entrepreneurs 
too poor to qualify for commercial lending. Accordingly, micro-credit programs extend small loans 
to poor people for income generating self-employment projects. The Grameen Bank micro-credit 
model has been successful in providing financially viable lending structures in a number of 
countries in ways that economically empower impoverished women by giving them access to 
credit. This success has led to replications of the Grameen Bank’s model throughout the world.  
This discussion paper explores key features of the Grameen Bank model and examines 
lessons that can be learnt from its replication in other countries. These lessons may be helpful in 
formulating policy to enable indigenous people, and in particular women, gain access to credit. 
Part one of the paper details the problems that indigenous people have in accessing credit. This is 
followed by a brief description of the Grameen Bank model, its application in indigenous 
communities in Canada and America, and a brief discussion of the problems that may be 
encountered if the model is to be adopted in indigenous communities in Australia.  
Current ATSIC business programs 
Analysis of current ATSIC business programs shows that they have not utilised micro-credit 
lending strategies.1 Current ATSIC programs aimed at supplying credit to indigenous businesses 
include the Commercial Development Corporation (CDC), the Business Funding Scheme, and the 
Indigenous Business Incentive Program which works in conjunction with the Community 
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme.  
The CDC deals with large-scale business enterprises, investing only in programs requiring a 
minimum of $500,000.
 
In accordance with this criterion, the Corporation invests predominantly 
in joint ventures between indigenous and non-indigenous partners. While the rationale behind 
investing in joint ventures is that they enable poorly skilled indigenous people to develop 
entrepreneurial skills, questions have been raised as to whether this rationale is justified (Arthur 
1996). Although indigenous partners participate on the Boards of Management of all joint 
ventures, it is unclear in what capacity they participate and thus the degree to which their 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills are being developed (Arthur 1996).  
Another aspect of the CDC’s joint venture schemes is that they are orientated towards 
forming partnerships with indigenous communities rather than with families or individuals. 
Dealing with communities rather than families and individuals changes the incentive structure 
within a business and allows a diffusion of responsibility over a business venture. Thus, it is 
argued that it may be more appropriate in some cases for joint ventures to be formed with 
individuals or family groups rather than whole communities (Arthur 1996). The large size of CDC 
loans and their preference for funding joint ventures indicates that the Corporation’s priorities are 
far removed from the provision of micro-credit. 
ATSIC programs which focus on smaller businesses include the Business Funding Scheme 
(BFS) and the Indigenous Business Incentive Program (IBIP). While the BFS operates within strict 
commercial parameters it nevertheless offers indigenous borrowers access to concessional finance 
in the form of loans, grants and guarantees, wage subsidies (for up to twelve months), and access 
to expert advice on the establishment and ongoing management of businesses (ATSIC 1998: 8-
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10).  Under the BFS the maximum amount of funding available is $500,000. Interest rates vary, 
with loans of up to $50,000 charged 1.5 per cent interest, while loans of between $100,000 and 
$500,000 are charged 6.5 per cent interest. Applicants must contribute at least 20 per cent equity 
to the enterprise, provide security to cover the loan and demonstrate that they have an aptitude 
for business. These requirements restrict access to the scheme to relatively well-off indigenous 
entrepreneurs who might otherwise be served by mainstream commercial financial institutions. 
What they do not do is offer an alternative source of finance to indigenous entrepreneurs who 
cannot access credit from commercial institutions.  
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody criticised the stringent 
commercial eligibility requirements associated with ATSIC business loan schemes. ATSIC’s IBIP 
was formed in 1992-93 following recommendations from the Royal Commission that ATSIC 
introduce a ‘softer’ business support program. The IBIP assists indigenous people to enter 
business by emphasising the funding, training and support requirements of new indigenous 
businesses. The Program provides concessional finance in the form of ‘seed funding’, or grants of 
up to $10,000, and equity grants of up to 25 per cent of the funding required (to a maximum of 
$50,000). Funding is only available to borrowers who have either undertaken a business training 
program or can demonstrate adequate business expertise (ATSIC 1998).  
The IBIP works in conjunction with the CDEP scheme to establish small businesses (defined 
as those employing six to nine employees) in rural Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities. The CDEP scheme was established in 1977 to provide part-time work and training 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in remote communities, as an alternative to 
unemployment benefits. The CDEP scheme has since been expanded to include indigenous 
participants who live in both rural and urban areas, although approximately 70 per cent of 
participants are members of remote communities. In 1997, the scheme employed over 30,000 
participants in more than 270 Aboriginal communities (Altman 1997: 6). Funds of up to $30,000 
per full-time position may be granted to CDEPs on the basis of employment outcomes. In 1995-
96, 60 CDEPs received funding for business development from the former Community Economic 
Initiatives Scheme (ATSIC 1998).  
ATSIC is committed to funding programs that supply credit to indigenous businesses. In 
1997-98 it allocated $14.5 million to the BFS and $30 million to the IBIP. Between 1994 and 
1997 the annual expenditure of the BFS has averaged $15.6 million. In the same period the 
annual expenditure of the Community Economic Initiatives Scheme increased steadily from $17.9 
million in 1994 to $20.3 million in 1997. 
Since 1970, ATSIC and its predecessor organisations have provided 1,457 loans at a total 
expenditure of $80 million, with approximately 70 per cent of loans being used to develop 
businesses in the agricultural, building, retailing and contract services industries. Of these loans 
403 are still being repaid and 651 have been fully repaid. Of the remaining loans, 276 are deemed 
unrecoverable and 127 have been frozen, with a residual balance owing (ATSIC 1998: 10-13). As 
of March 1998, 43 per cent of the total amount of active loans were overdue (Table 1), indicating 
that the organisation has serious problems with loan defaults. Internal analysis conducted by 
ATSIC also shows that defaults are more likely to occur if loans are in rural areas, a finding which 
has resulted in fewer loans being made in rural areas (ATSIC 1998). Tightening eligibility rules 
have further exacerbated the difficulty that rural indigenous people have in accessing loans.  
Table 1. ATSIC business loan arrears as of March 1998 
Arrears Restructured 
loans a 
Overdue 
31-90 days 
Overdue 91+ 
days 
Impending 
legal 
outcome 
Total 
overdue 
Value $000s 558 78 1,212 2,677 4,596 
As percentage of 
total 
outstanding  
 
 
1.4 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
6.8 
 
 
11.6 
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Number 42 34 42 68 186 
As percentage of 
total active 
borrowers 
 
 
10.2 
 
 
8.3 
 
 
7.8 
 
 
16.6 
 
 
43 
Note: a. A restructured loan refers to bad loans that have been restructured to ease the burden of repayment, usually 
by extending the period of repayment. 
Source:  ATSIC 1998. 
Further internal investigations conducted by ATSIC have shown that smaller loans (of less 
than $30,000) are more likely to be repaid. In spite of this, ATSIC continues to focus on making 
large loans to indigenous businesses. For example, between 1993 and 1998 the average size of 
ATSIC loans was $94,200 and in 1998 the average loan from the IBIP was $83,333 (ATSIC 1998: 
15). Similarly, in 1995-96 the average loan from the Community Economic Initiatives Scheme was 
$130,000 (ATSIC 1997: 46). This large average loan size shows that while these programs are 
supposedly directed at ‘small’ businesses they are not concerned with the provision of micro-
credit funding. For example, these amounts stand in stark contrast to the average loan size of 
$8,500 made by the Australian micro-credit scheme, First Business Finance (FBF) (FBF 1996: 4). 
One of the reasons for the failure of ATSIC to provide micro-credit funding for indigenous 
businesses is the tighter eligibility criteria on business loans introduced in 1993 following a 
review of ATSIC’s lending procedures. Prior to the review over 50 per cent of ATSIC business loans 
were for amounts of less than $25,000; since 1993 this has fallen to 25 per cent (Table 2). The 
most common loan size before 1993 was $10,000; since 1993 this amount has increased to 
$50,000 (Table 3). These figures suggest that in tightening the eligibility requirements on loans 
ATSIC has focused increasingly on large rather than small-scale lending, thus reducing the 
possibility of providing micro-credit funding for indigenous businesses. 
Table 2. ATSIC business loan sizes pre- and post-1993 
Loan size  Pre-1993 
Number 
Pre-1993 
Percentage 
Post-1993 
Number 
Post-1993 
Percentage 
$0 to $25,000 586 50.52 85 25.07 
$25,001 to $50,000 219 18.88 98 28.91 
$50,001 to $75,000 111 9.57 41 12.09 
$75,001 to $10,0000 76 6.55 46 13.57 
$10,0001 to $200,000 104 8.96 26 7.68 
$200,000 to $500,000 47 4.05 41 12.09 
More than $500,000 17 1.47 2 0.59 
Totals 1160 100 339 100 
Source: ATSIC 1998. 
Table 3. Mean, median and modal figures for ATSIC loans pre- and post-1993 
Statistic Loans made prior to 1993 Loans made post 1993 
Mean $62,400 $94,200 
Median  $25,000 $50,000 
Mode $10,000 $50,000 
Source: ATSIC 1998. 
`Aboriginal access to non-government micro-credit 
Just as the government has failed to address the micro-credit needs of indigenous businesses, so 
too has the private sector. Micro-businesses (defined as those employing less than five people) 
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have a high failure rate and are considered high risk investments (Dahn 1992). Micro-business 
borrowers seek to borrow sums that, because of their small, often non-standard, character, incur 
disproportionately high transaction costs (Dahn 1992). These characteristics make lending to 
micro-businesses appear high-risk as well as high-cost, causing banks to charge interest rates 
that are far higher than those for larger businesses. Reports indicate that in 1998 banks were 
charging interest rates for micro-businesses that were 5 to 6 percentage points higher than those 
for housing loans (Micro Business Consultancy Group 1998: 69). The effect of these high interest 
rates is to increase borrowing disincentives and add additional cost pressures to micro-
businesses borrowers. 
Credit access problems are further compounded for indigenous entrepreneurs who often 
have limited credit records and no collateral. In addition to language barriers, most indigenous 
communities lack savings, Commonwealth and State legislation prohibits the use of communal 
Aboriginal land as collateral, and indigenous people have few employment opportunities in rural 
areas from which to accumulate equity (ATSIC 1998: 22-23).2 Another reason for the lack of 
access to credit is that financial institutions have limited information on indigenous business and 
borrowers and are unaccustomed to dealing with them. This creates serious problems for 
financial institutions when determining the credit-worthiness of indigenous borrowers. Thus, 
existing financial institutions find it unprofitable to bear the risks of lending to indigenous people.  
Access to credit among indigenous women entrepreneurs 
In 1991 self-employed indigenous Australian’s made up 4 per cent of the total indigenous labour 
force (Daly 1995). Research into the composition of indigenous self-employed people has shown 
that in 1991 their were 1.96 self-employed indigenous males to every self-employed indigenous 
female (Hunter 1999: 6-7). By 1996 this ratio had fallen to 1.73, indicating that there may have 
been an increase in the number of self-employed indigenous women (Hunter 1999: 6-7). Analysis 
by Hunter (1999) of 1986, 1991 and 1996 census data shows that indigenous females are 
proportionately more likely to be qualified in business-related fields than non-indigenous males. 
This finding suggests that, if the quality of qualifications received by both groups is not 
substantially different, then there may be potential for conducting business among indigenous 
females (Hunter 1999: 7).  
Problems faced by indigenous women in terms of access to credit are often more acute than 
those faced by the general indigenous community. Indigenous women are less likely to have 
personal collateral or a credit history than their male counterparts making the perceived risks of 
lending to them even greater (Dana 1996: 55). Further, women in general are considered less 
financially attractive by lending institutions than men because they tend to borrow smaller loans 
(Howell 1993: 20-23). In spite of these problems the ATSIC BFS estimated that in 1995-96 
indigenous women made up 37 per cent of their total loan recipients (ATSIC 1996: 42). 
While little has been written on indigenous women entrepreneurs, a study conducted by 
Dana in 1996, using a sample of 76 Aboriginal women entrepreneurs, provides evidence of the 
role of Aboriginal women in the economy. Dana’s study suggests that Aboriginal women 
entrepreneurs invest in a range of commercial enterprises throughout Australia. The majority of 
these enterprises were located in activities commonly associated with women, such as retail 
clothing stores, arts and crafts manufacturing, child care centres and beauty salons. Self-
employed women were located in retail, service and arts and crafts enterprises as well as 
professional consultancies and enterprises (Dana 1996: 94-95). Similarly, research conducted by 
Arthur in Torres Strait showed a number of women ‘petty traders’ engaged in self-employed 
activities, such as selling cigarettes or soft-drink from their houses (Arthur 1990: 33). 
 Of the 76 commercial enterprise owners interviewed by Dana, 62 were located in urban 
areas. The remaining 14 enterprises were located in rural areas and were either partnerships or 
informal operators. Importantly, none of the commercial enterprises studied were located in 
remote areas. Conversely, of the seven community enterprises studied (all of which were non-
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profit), all except one were located in remote areas. Thus Dana argues that in moving from rural 
to urban settings Aboriginal women become increasingly involved in self-employed commercial, 
rather than community, operations (Dana 1996: 91-93). 
A possible explanation for the failure of rural Aboriginal women to become involved in 
commercial enterprises may be a lack of access to credit. Of the Aboriginal women entrepreneurs 
studied, 51 per cent were funded through ATSIC’s BFS, 28 per cent used personal finances to 
support their enterprises, 13 per cent had access to commercial funding, and 8 per cent had 
access to other government funding assistance. 
While over half of the Aboriginal women studied were able to access government funding 
one of the main reasons given the for failure of the women studied to access government funds, in 
the form of government sponsored low interest loans or guarantees, was an ignorance of the 
operation of these funds (Dana 1996). Of the Aboriginal women entrepreneurs surveyed, only ten 
accessed loans from commercial lending institutions, and of these seven were employers. Dana 
reports that these employers preferred commercial lending institutions rather than government or 
ATSIC loans, despite the higher interest rate charged, because non-commercial lenders were 
paternalistic, attaching ‘too many strings’ to loans (Dana 1996: 117). However, the reasons given 
by Aboriginal women for their failure to access commercial loans included an anticipation of 
rejection based on a lack of collateral and formal education or training, ‘intimidation’ in dealing 
with ‘white men’ (lenders), and a belief that lenders would be ‘prejudiced against Aboriginal 
people’ and women (Dana 1996: 117). 
Dana argues that ATSIC’s BFS was viewed by Aboriginal women entrepreneurs as intrusive 
based on the over-involvement of ATSIC agents in women’s enterprise plans. Another criticism of 
the Scheme was the excessive time it took from application to loan disbursement.3 Finally, many 
of the Aboriginal women surveyed, particularly informal operators, could not access funding from 
the Scheme. These informal operators felt that their loans had been rejected because ATSIC 
officers failed to understand the nature of their loan proposals (Dana 1996: 119-25). 
Lack of access to adequate funding appears to be a significant factor affecting the ability of 
rural Aboriginal women entrepreneurs to operate businesses. For example, women with adequate 
access to capital operated full-time enterprises in the formal sector whereas women with less than 
adequate access to funding operated part-time or casual enterprises in the informal sector (Dana 
1996: 167-68). Dana’s work suggests that there are deficiencies in the current sources of finance 
available to rural Aboriginal women.  
The key elements of the Grameen Bank micro-credit model 
Problems with access to credit are not unique to Australia’s indigenous communities. Similar 
problems exist not only in other Fourth world indigenous communities but also in developing 
countries. One financial institution that has emerged specifically to deal with these problems is 
the Grameen Bank. The Grameen Bank originated in rural Bangladesh in 1976. Initially, the 
Bank was formed to test the hypothesis that if financial resources were available to the poor at 
reasonable rates of interest, they would be able to generate productive self-employment without 
external assistance. In line with this hypothesis, the target group of the Bank are the poorest of 
the poor, who are almost exclusively women.  
Experience obtained by the Grameen Bank suggests that potential borrowers need to 
complete several steps in order to ensure loan repayment. The first is for members to self-select 
themselves into groups of five. Experience has taught the Bank that loans are more likely to be 
repaid if groups include only individuals of the same gender, from the same village and from 
similar economic backgrounds (Khandker, Khalily and Khan 1995: 10). Before a loan is granted, 
groups participate in a week long training program where they are taught the rules and 
regulations of the Bank. If the Bank is satisfied with the group’s response to this training then 
loans are issued. Each member identifies the purpose of their loan with guidance from other 
members of the group. Loans issued to new members are small, approximately Bangladesh Taka 
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2,000 to 5,000 (A$100 to A$250) with an upper limit of 10,000 (A$500). All loans are repaid in 
weekly instalments over a period of a year. Interest rates are currently fixed at 20 per cent per 
annum (Hossain 1993: 24-29).  
To overcome problems of loan defaults the Grameen Bank has developed a system of 
mutual accountability based on a peer group lending structure. Under this structure the group as 
a whole becomes ineligible to receive any additional loans if any member of the group defaults. 
This ensures that peer pressure is exerted on members to maintain regular payments. A group 
may decide to fine or expel a member who fails to attend group meetings or who wilfully defaults 
on payments of instalments. Conversely, groups may encourage and support a member who 
cannot repay in times of genuine difficulty. A member may leave the group when their loan is 
repaid. If a member leaves before repaying their loan, the responsibility for repayment falls on the 
group as a whole. In this way the mutual accountability fostered by the Bank works as a form of 
social capital, as opposed to the financial capital which is the basis for mainstream commercial 
banking (Hossain 1988).  
The process of forming groups by allowing members to self-select has been found to reduce 
the credit risks associated with lending. Given that each member of a group is awarded loans 
depending on the outcome of other members’ loans, individuals have an incentive to join a group 
where all members have an equal, if not lower, credit risk than themselves (Varian 1990). Put 
another way, when one individual is a higher credit risk than all other group members, then that 
individual is being subsidised by the rest of the group (Stiglitz 1990). The Grameen Bank policy of 
lending to relatively homogenous groups comprised of members of the same sex and from similar 
economic backgrounds helps to explain why the Bank’s repayment rates are far higher than loans 
programs in which groups are formed on the basis of administrative decisions (Huppi and Feder 
1990). Thus it appears that successful peer monitoring requires that borrower groups are 
comprised of relatively homogeneous membership. 
Successful peer monitoring also requires a small borrower group. Small groups foster closer 
ties among members and can reduce the cost associated with accessing information. Practice has 
shown that group size has a marked impact on the repayment rate associated with loans, with 
groups of 100 members performing far worse than groups of 10 to 20 members. The Grameen 
Bank has settled on a group size of five through a process of trial and error. Initially the size of 
Grameen Bank groups was ten or more members. This proved unsatisfactory however, because as 
groups become larger the diversity among the economic conditions of members increased and the 
decision-making process became lengthy. In the end five-member groups proved the most 
practical size (Huppi and Feder 1990). Another reason for maintaining a small group size is that 
as group size increases, the incentives of individual members to monitor the action of their peers' 
falls. This reduced incentive occurs because with increasing membership the costs to each 
individual from a defaulting member falls and therefore the incentive to monitor behaviour 
decreases. Finally, it is argued that there is a free-rider problem associated with large groups in 
that each member would prefer that others monitor and incur the ill will resulting from reporting 
offenders who have misused the funds lent to them (Stiglitz 1990: 361). 
The social relationship or social capital that exists between members also has a direct 
impact on the repayment rate of a group. A dominant feature of many communities in developed 
countries is the degree of interdependency that exists between individuals. Within this context 
village organisations often serve to provide welfare services and infrastructure. Participation in 
village life often requires a restraint on self-interested behaviour, and a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms, in the form of social sanctions, are invoked to ensure this. Working from this 
understanding, it has been argued that if an individual does not repay their loan this will cause a 
loss to other members of the group invoking social sanctions against the defaulting member 
(Besley and Coate 1995, Cable and Shane 1997). 
The types of penalties that may be imposed on a defaulting member of a group include the 
loss of material goods and reputation. Within the Grameen Bank, contributing members' report 
the behaviour of a defaulting member at a centre meeting, thereby augmenting the 
admonishment felt by the defaulting member. Also other members of the group will reduce their 
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cooperation with the defaulting member in the future. This penalty can be particularly 
devastating if there is some form of exchange or mutual support that occurs between group 
members independent of the loan scheme. For example, group members may rely on each other's 
help in productive activities or may help each other in times of trouble. Finally, if social penalties 
are sufficiently severe, group lending will yield higher repayment rates than individual lending 
(Beasley and Coate 1995). 
Thus it appears that social capital, in the form of sanctions available to community 
members to discipline poor repayment behaviour, is a key element in the operation of group 
lending schemes. This may explain why group lending schemes, such as the Grameen Bank, have 
been so successful in developing countries where interdependence within communities is typically 
high (Besley and Coate 1995). In contrast, an absence of interdependence in most communities in 
developed countries may help to explain why group lending schemes in these countries have been 
less successful. 
Indications of the success of the Grameen Bank’s micro-credit model in Bangladesh are the 
repayment rate of its loans and in the benefits accompanying its membership. Between 1987 and 
1992 the repayment rates of the Grameen Bank’s individual loans were consistently in excess of 
95 per cent. These repayment rates are higher than those recorded by most mainstream financial 
institutions. In terms of the benefits that accrue to members, studies indicate that membership of 
the Grameen Bank empowers women (who make up approximately 95 per cent of all members) 
(Rahman 1986; Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994; Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996), increases the 
income and employment opportunities of members (Hossain 1985; Hossain 1988; Alam 1988; 
Khandker, Khalily and Khan 1995) and improves their housing (Rahman and Hasnat 1993; 
Wahid 1994;) and nutrition (Wahid 1994).  
Case studies of replications of the Grameen micro-credit model 
The financial viability of the Grameen Bank and its ability to promote welfare gains for the 
poor has led to attempts to replicate the model in developing countries in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa, and in developed countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia. This paper 
focuses on case studies that have used the Grameen model for piloting credit delivery projects 
outside Bangladesh, with particular reference to the experience of credit programs designed for 
indigenous populations. Lessons learned from this experience suggest that various key elements 
are pre-requisites for successful replication. Studying these attempts also helps to identify some 
of the problems experienced when credit programs designed for the poor are introduced into 
developed countries. 
Opinions as to the feasibility of replicating the Grameen Bank credit delivery model vary. 
Muhammad Yunus the founder of the Grameen Bank, as well as other founders of Grameen Bank 
replications in Asia, advocate an approach in which that the Bank model can be used as a pilot 
project in another country. They argue, that successful replication depends on the economic, 
social and political climates of the other countries being sufficiently similar to those found in 
Bangladesh, and on the creation of organisations that are capable of training personnel with the 
relevant skills, attitudes and knowledge of the Grameen Bank model (Hulme 1990; Hulme and 
Turner 1990). One benefit of establishing pilot projects is that it enables a ‘learning processes 
approach’ (Hulme 1990: 297-8). Under this approach the Grameen Bank is first introduced as a 
small-scale experiment in a new country. The experiment is closely monitored and the institution 
is modified to suit its new environment. Importantly, the learning processes approach recognises 
the inherently experimental nature of the transfer process and acknowledges that success is not 
guaranteed (Hulme 1990). 
Lessons from Credit and Savings for the Hardcore Poor (CASHPOR), the main organisation 
that administers Grameen Bank replications in Asia, suggest that pilot projects apply the 
complete Grameen model in the initial stages of introduction leaving changes to be made to the 
model only when they prove necessary.4 This ensures that failure is not attributed to Grameen 
features when it has resulted from adaptations introduced into the model. Gibbons, the director 
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of CASHPOR, distinguishes between the ‘essential Grameen’, which he terms ‘the coherent set of 
principles and procedures that delivers credit cost effectively to the poor’, and non-essential 
culture specific elements of the model which can be adapted to the local culture (Gibbons 1994: 
102). The ‘essential Grameen’ features are, according to Gibbons, an exclusive focus on the poor 
(and particularly poor women), simple loans procedures administered at a village level, small 
loans repaid weekly, self-selected loan projects, collective responsibility through a group 
repayment structure, compulsory group savings, strict credit discipline, and close supervision of 
loan repayments. Other ‘essential Grameen’ requirements to be applied at the individual project 
level are: field-orientated management, political neutrality, open and transparent conduct of all 
business, and the setting of interest rates to cover operating costs (Gibbons 1994). 
Features relevant to the process of replication include the ability to reduce costs incurred by 
a lending agency by maintaining high repayment rates and lowering transaction costs incurred by 
borrowers (Hulme 1990; Todd 1996;).5 The experience in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Peru has 
pointed out that the high repayment rate of the Grameen Bank is closely associated with its peer 
group lending structure. In these countries the peer lending structure enables agencies to keep 
costs low by allowing field officers to handle relatively high account loads, up to 300 per officer 
(Hulme 1990; Todd 1996).6 Experience also shows that the Grameen Bank minimises transaction 
costs by conducting all transactions close to the borrowers’ residence. Replication of this feature 
may be problematic in countries with low population densities because the distance of meeting 
sites from borrower residents is likely to be large (Hulme 1990; Todd 1996;). 
Pilot projects studied by Todd (1996) all managed to overcome their difficulties and 
implement the ‘essential Grameen’ features. In the projects involved, poor women formed into 
peer groups, all projects recorded high repayment rates and showed prospects of becoming 
financially viable. The principal conclusion of this review was that the success of the Grameen 
Bank replications in India, Nepal and Vietnam, when taken in conjunction with the success of 
past replications in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, established once and for all the 
international replicability of the Grameen Bank model (Todd 1996: 99). 
Replicability in communities in developed countries: some questions 
While Todd and others are convinced of the ability to replicate the Grameen Bank model 
successfully in Asia, questions remain about the ability to replicate it in developed countries. In 
an attempt to address these questions case studies of the FBF micro-credit program that operated 
in Australia and of the Lakota and First People’s Fund micro-credit programs that operate in rural 
indigenous communities in America and Canada respectively, are considered. The aim of these 
projects has been to enable poor people to develop their own micro-enterprises. To achieve this 
aim all three projects adopted the Grameen Bank’s concept of lending micro-credit, and both the 
Lakota Fund and First People’s Fund projects adopted the Grameen Bank’s peer lending model. 
The FBF scheme was an initiative of the New South Wales government that operated 
between 1994 and 1997 with the aim of providing micro-credit finance to fund micro-businesses. 
In the FBF scheme, loans were made to borrowers who had few assets, a low level of savings and 
were often unemployed.7 Of the borrowers approved by FBF in the 1995-96 financial year, 11 were 
female, 20 were male and the remaining 15 were partnerships (Table 4). It is significant that while 
women represented only 18 per cent of all applicants they had a higher average approval rating, 
at 55 per cent, than either their male counterparts, on 34 per cent, or partnerships, on 48 per 
cent (FBF 1996: 6). Many of the borrowers in the scheme already had some training in small 
business management, with a large number being graduates of the New Enterprise Incentive 
Scheme, a Federal Government training and support program assisting unemployed people to 
start their own businesses (Evans 1996: 1-5).  
Table 4. FBF approval rate by applicant 1995-96 
 Number of 
submissions 
Value of 
submissions 
Number of 
approvals 
Value of 
approvals 
Approval 
rate (per 
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($000s) ($000s) cent) 
Male 58 501.5 20 184.0 34 
Female 20 164.5 11 82.0 55 
Partnership 31 269.8 15 132.8 48 
Total 109 935.8 46 398.8 42 
Source: FBF 1995-96. 
Before a loan could be granted, FBF applicants had to prepare a written business plan that 
was assessed and approved by business professionals within the community. Borrowers were 
required to repay their loans regardless of whether or not their business was successful (Evans 
1996). The maximum amount available to borrowers under the scheme was $10,000. The 
majority of businesses in the scheme were either new or in the early stages of growth, and ranged 
from small-scale manufacturers to health practitioners and information technology specialists 
(Evans 1996). After two years of operation the net losses recorded by FBF were $16,120.63 or 
approximately 3 per cent of the total loan portfolio, a result that indicates that FBF had, at least 
initially, achieved reasonable financial viability (FBF 1996: 7).  
The benefits associated with micro-enterprise projects, such as their ability to develop self-
esteem, leadership skills and economic literacy among members, has led to demand for these 
projects in indigenous communities in developed countries. Unlike the problems faced in trying to 
target the poorest of the poor in many Grameen Bank replication projects in developed countries, 
the target group for projects within indigenous communities is easily defined. The Pine Ridge 
Reservation in South Dakota in which the Lakota Fund is located, was ranked as one of the 
poorest areas in both the 1980 and 1990 United States Census (Environmental Protection 
Authority 1996). In 1992 total unemployment on the Reservation was 95 per cent. In 1985 the 
per capita income of people on the Reservation was US$2,367 (A$2,840), the majority of which 
came from welfare payments. In addition the Reservation suffered from a high degree of 
alcoholism and substance abuse (Novagratz 1992). 
The Lakota Fund was established in 1985 by the First Nations Development Institute. The 
aim of the Fund was ‘to support the development of private, Lakota owned and operated 
businesses on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation by providing technical assistance and fostering 
personal development’ (Novogratz 1992). The importance of this development was that at the time 
of the Fund’s inception Pine Ridge had less than 40 businesses, the majority of which were owned 
by people who were not Native Americans (The Grameen Dialogue 1998). In 1992, the Lakota 
Fund became a separate non-profit organisation, to be controlled by the Ogola Lakota people 
rather than the First Nations Development Institute. Under this arrangement the Lakota Fund is 
staffed by four tribal members. The nine-member board of directors is also composed of tribal 
members who reside on the Reservation, with one place left for a professional business person 
from outside the Reservation (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) 1998). Thus the 
organisational structure of the Lakota Fund allows representatives of the Ogola Lakota people to 
determine the allocation of Fund resources. 
The peer lending structure employed by the Lakota Fund consists of individuals forming 
into ‘circles’ of between four to six people. After five training sessions a group becomes a certified 
circle. Circle members then decide who will receive the first loan. Initial loans are available for a 
maximum amount of A$550, with additional loans ranging from A$140 to A$7,000. All additional 
loans are conditional on the successful repayment of the first loan by all group members, and on 
regular attendance at circle meetings. Loan payments are made to a staff member at bi-weekly 
circle meetings (The Grameen Dialogue 1998: 4).  
In 1987, The Calmeadow Foundation started a Native Self-Employment Loan Program to 
examine the viability of the use of micro-enterprise programs in Canadian Inuit and Indian 
communities. From this initiative came the First People’s Fund, which uses the peer lending 
structure developed by the Grameen Bank to provide loans to indigenous borrowers (Campbell 
1995). Under this structure borrowers form lending groups of four to seven people who approve 
and collectively guarantee loans. No collateral or equity is required in order to borrow. Loans are 
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offered at commercial interest rates and range from A$300 to A$3,000. All loan funds are 
administered by the indigenous communities themselves, with administrative support from the 
First People’s Fund (CIBC 1998). 
Unlike the FBF project a major problem facing micro-credit funds in Indigenous 
communities in developed countries has been their failure to achieve financial viability. Since its 
inception in 1985 the Lakota Fund has made over 300 micro-enterprise loans, totalling over $1.5 
million dollars. The average size of a loan is A$5,000 (The Grameen Dialogue 1998: 4). Many of 
the activities invested in by Lakota Fund borrowers are home-based activities and over 75 per 
cent of borrowers are arts and crafts producers.8 In 1994 the Lakota Fund’s budget was 
A$460,000. The organisation generated A$51,000 in interest income from loans and investments, 
with the rest of the money generated from subsidised borrowing from foundations, corporations, 
individuals and religious organisations willing to invest in the Fund for a 0-4 per cent rate of 
return. In 1994 the Fund’s delinquency rate was approximately 10 per cent, with delinquencies in 
earlier years ranging from 15-25 per cent, to an all time high of 35 per cent (Environmental 
Protection Authority 1996). At face value this delinquency rate looks high, however, little is known 
about the gender composition of borrower circles or whether peer group lending is strictly 
enforced. Without this analysis it is unclear why the initial delinquency rate recorded by the Fund 
was so high.  
The inability to assess the reasons behind the high initial default rate of the Lakota Fund is 
symptomatic of the lack of information available on micro-credit programs in indigenous 
communities in developed countries. However, while projects in rural communities in developed 
countries have, in recent years, achieved high repayment rates, the results of the Lakota Fund 
suggest that projects in indigenous communities have not been as successful. It is ironic that 
while the poverty in indigenous communities more closely replicates poverty conditions in 
Bangladesh than other communities in developed countries, it is in these communities that the 
model has been the least successful. Despite these problems, replications of the model in 
developed countries show not only that elements of the model, such as the peer group lending 
system and the emphasis on micro-credit, are transferable but that this transfer can have social 
benefits for the communities involved. 
Implications for Australian public policy 
In a recent submission to the HORSCATSIA Inquiry into Indigenous Business the ATSIC argued 
that current business programs available to Aboriginal people need improvement and that they 
‘are open to suggestions of alternative models to improve access of indigenous business 
entrepreneurs to business finance’ (ATSIC 1998: 24). One such model is the micro-credit model 
devised by the Grameen Bank. 
Analysis of current data on business funding suggests that micro-credit is not being 
provided to indigenous communities by either government or commercial sources. Moreover 
problems with access to credit for indigenous micro-businesses are compounded when 
entrepreneurs are women. It is possible that a Grameen Bank model if replicated successfully 
within Aboriginal communities could provide such credit. The key elements of the Grameen Bank 
model are its peer lending structure and its emphasis on micro-credit loans. Importantly, these 
elements appear to be transferable to developed countries. However if such a replication is ever to 
be successful it must overcome a series of problems. 
Case studies of replications of micro-credit programs suggest that in adapting the Grameen 
Bank model to Australia policy makers would face problems associated with low population 
density, welfare disincentives, investment opportunities and the interdependence that may be 
present within Aboriginal communities. The relatively low population density of most areas of 
Australia when compared to areas such as Bangladesh mean that the costs of delivering and 
accessing credit services may be prohibitive. The effect of low population density is evident in the 
problems that many American micro-credit programs face in delivering a sufficient number of 
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loans to attain economies of scale and thus financial viability. These problems have prompted the 
director of American based Grameen replications to suggest that no program in America that is 
loosely based on the Grameen micro-credit model has been able to grow beyond several hundred 
borrowers (Bacon 1993). Financial viability also appears to be a problem for many micro-
enterprise programs in developed countries because they face the dual constraints of high 
training requirements for borrowers and small loan portfolio size (Novogratz 1992). In addition, 
the low income levels of the target groups of these programs mean that they cannot afford to pay 
market rates for training. At least in the short-term, few micro-enterprise programs in place 
within developed countries appear to be viable (Novogratz 1992). 
Another problem faced by replications of the Grameen Bank micro-credit model in 
developed countries is the disincentive caused by welfare payments to either borrow or repay 
loans. Disincentives to repay loans are caused because, unlike borrowers in Bangladesh where 
defaulting borrowers are plunged back into poverty, borrowers who operate in a welfare state have 
a social security net to fall back on. Disincentives to borrow loans are caused when welfare 
payments are structured so that investing in businesses results in a loss of benefits. Welfare laws 
within Australia ensure that once an individual earns above a certain amount of income, the 
benefits received from welfare payments decrease. 
A Grameen based Australian micro-credit model may face problems in finding investment 
opportunities for indigenous businesses. In particular, there may be difficulty in finding 
investments that generate the large immediate returns for small amounts of capital around which 
the model is structured. These problems will be compounded in rural and remote areas where 
there are often high transport costs in gaining access to markets and a lack of the requisite 
business skills. 
 The interdependence of some indigenous communities may either work to aid the Grameen 
Bank’s peer lending structure or may undermine it. Strong kinship networks have led to 
interdependence within Aboriginal communities. Within these communities Aboriginal people 
derive much of their identity from their family and community context. It is possible that if the 
interdependence that is present within some Aboriginal communities is able to be harnessed it 
could provide the social penalty mechanism so essential to successful peer group lending. 
However, it is also possible that the cultural practices which inform the interdependence found 
within some Aboriginal communities may undermine the peer group lending structure. For 
example, the cultural practice of reciprocity may result in the wider community placing demands 
on individuals’ loans (Martin 1995; Schwab 1995). Similarly, cultural practices such as 
reciprocity may affect the ability to operate businesses within some indigenous communities. 
The problems detailed above indicate that the successful adoption of a Grameen Bank 
micro-credit model within Australia is far from assured. While similar models have informed 
indigenous economic policy in other developed countries a number of questions need to be 
answered before they should be adopted as policy within Australia. These questions are:  
• whether micro-credit programs can be financially viable in areas of low population density;  
• to what extent welfare payments work as a disincentive to invest in micro-credit;  
• whether micro-credit investment opportunities are available in Australia; and 
• what effect specific indigenous cultural practices have on the adoption of a Grameen Bank 
micro-credit model in Australian indigenous communities. 
Notes 
1. For the purposes of this paper, micro-credit in an Australian context is defined as the process of 
lending amounts of less than A$10,000. 
2. Recent work on economic literacy in Aboriginal communities shows that Aboriginal people in remote 
areas continue to be confused about a range of contemporary economic issues. Aboriginal people in 
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Arnhem Land were found to be confused about words like ‘trade, economics, economic development, 
budget, auditor, credit, creditors, value, debt, government revenue etc.’ (Buchanan 1998). 
3. This criticism was also made repeatedly in the submissions to the HORSCATSIA Inquiry into 
Indigenous Business (HORSCATSIA 1998). 
4. CASHPOR was formed in 1991 by the founders of the first seven Grameen Bank replication projects 
within Asia. It receives financial support from the Asia Pacific Development Center and the Grameen 
Trust. CASHPOR works to both develop replication in countries where the Grameen Bank model has 
not been tried, such as Vietnam, Nepal and China, as well as help the expansion of successful 
replication projects already in existence, such as those in India, the Philippines and Indonesia. As of 
October 1997 CASHPOR had 24 programs in eight countries, which together bring financial services to 
over 240,000 poor women. 
5. Helen Todd has analysed the CASHPOR projects of Nirdhan in Nepal and West Bengal, SHARE in 
Andahra Pradesh and Tau Yew Mai in Vietnam (Todd 1996). 
6. The importance of cost minimisation is that it allows projects to move in the direction of financial 
viability. Todd argues that replication projects should aim to reduce costs to 20 per cent of the 
outstanding debt. However she concedes that it will take most replication projects at least four years 
to reach the level of operation where economies of scale make it possible to do this. In relation to the 
projects studied by Todd (approximately two years after start-up) the cost per loan varied 
considerably, from a high of 81 per cent for SHARE to 43 per cent for Tau Yew Mai to 40 per cent for 
Nirdhan West Bengal to a low of 21 per cent for Nirdhan Nepal. Using these figures it is clear that only 
one project was anywhere near financial self-sufficiency. Moreover, the projects were covering only a 
small proportion of their costs from interest income earned from borrowers (Todd 1996). 
7. Of the borrowers approved by FBF between 1994 and 1996, 20 per cent had been unemployed for 
more than six months, 32 per cent had been unemployed for less than six months, and the remaining 
38 per cent were either self-employed or employed. 
8. This fact led to the Fund to develop an art and craft marketing project in which special marketing 
assistance is given to producers of arts and crafts. Feedback indicates that prior to the operation of 
the project many producers had not considered themselves actually in business. The marketing 
program was able to introduce business concepts in a way that was both culturally appropriate and 
relevant. The program offers training, sells products retail and wholesale for producers, operates a 
supply bank and sets up lines of communication between local artists and the outside market. 
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Notes 
 
1 For the purposes of this paper, micro-credit in an Australian context is defined as the process of lending amounts of 
less than $10,000. 
2 Recent work on economic literacy in Aboriginal communities shows that Aboriginal people in remote areas continue 
to be confused about a range of contemporary economic issues. Aboriginal people in Arnhem land were found to be 
confused about words like ‘trade, economics, economic development, budget, auditor, credit, creditors, value, debt, 
Government revenue etc.’ (Buchanan 1998). 
3 This criticism was also made repeatedly in the submissions to the HORSCATSIA Inquiry into Indigenous Business 
(HORSCATSIA 1998). 
4 CASHPOR was formed in 1991 by the founders of the first seven Grameen Bank replication projects within Asia. It 
receives financial support from the Asia Pacific Development Center and the Grameen Trust. CASHPOR works to 
both develop replication in countries where the Grameen Bank model has not been tried, such as Vietnam, Nepal and 
China, as well as help the expansion of successful replication projects already in existence, such as those in India, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. As of October 1997 CASHPOR had 24 programs in eight countries, which together bring 
financial services to over 240,000 poor women. 
5 Helen Todd has analysed the CASHPOR projects of Nirdhan in Nepal and West Bengal, SHARE in Andahra 
Pradesh and Tau Yew Mai in Vietnam (Todd 1996). 
6 The importance of cost minimisation is that it allows projects to move in the direction of financial viability. Todd 
argues that replication projects should aim to reduce costs to 20 per cent of the outstanding debt. However she 
concedes that it will take most replication projects at least four years to reach the level of operation where economies 
of scale make it possible to do this. In relation to the projects studied by Todd (approximately two years after start-up) 
the cost per loan varied considerably, from a high of 81 per cent for SHARE to 43 per cent for Tau Yew Mai to 40 per 
cent for Nirdhan West Bengal to a low of 21 per cent for Nirdhan Nepal. Using these figures it is clear that only one 
project was anywhere near financial self-sufficiency. Moreover, the projects were covering only a small proportion of 
their costs from interest income earned from borrowers (Todd 1996). 
7 Of the borrowers approved by FBF between 1994 and 1996, 20 per cent had been unemployed for more than six 
months, 32 per cent had been unemployed for less than six months, and the remaining 38 per cent were either self-
employed or employed. 
8 This fact led to the Fund to develop an arts and crafts marketing project in which special marketing assistance is 
given to producers of arts and crafts. Feedback indicates that prior to the operation of the project many producers had 
not considered themselves actually in business. The marketing program was able to introduce business concepts in a 
way which was both culturally appropriate and relevant. The program offers training, sells products retail and 
wholesale for producers, operates a supply bank and sets up lines of communication between local artists and the 
outside market. 
